• Abstract: There are important disanalogies between inner and outer sense in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. I focus on one such disanalogy: although all intuitions are in time, time is the immediate condition only of inner appearances, while it is merely the mediate condition of outer ones (KrV, A 34/B 50). I argue that Kant’s account of self-affection makes room for distinctively inner intuitions—perceptions of our own mental states that inform our empirical self-consciousness. Against readings that deny the possibility of inner intuitions, I show that Kant’s claims about temporality and empirical self-consciousness can be interpreted in a way that not only allows for inner intuitions, but also requires them to explain how we perceive ourselves as thinking and feeling beings in time.

    In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 677-686 doi:10.1515/9783110701357

  • Abstract: What conditions does a robot have to satisfy to qualify as a moral agent? Should robots become moral agents, or should humanity fully retain agency and personhood for itself? Is it permissible to prevent robots from developing moral agency? This paper examines these questions from a viewpoint-neutral and a Kantian perspective. Regarding the first question, we argue that the Kantian standards for moral agency could not possibly be met by robots. The second and third questions are more difficult to answer, in part because the viewpoint-neutral perspective does not provide a clear verdict. We argue that it is a feature of the Kantian perspective to propose a plausible answer. The idea is that preventing robots from achieving moral personality is morally permissible, insofar as our intention is consistent with the respect of human life and its rational nature.

    In Hyeongjoo Kim and Dieter Schönecker (eds.), Kant and Artificial Intelligence, publisher: De Gruyter, pp. 147-168. doi:10.1515/9783110706611

Publications

  • in History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis. Volume 25:1. Guest Editors: Benossi, L., Bernecker, S. & Ohlhorst J.

Edited

Manuscripts

  • Draft available

    I examine an unresolved aspect of Kant’s theory of taste: whether geometric decorations can be beautiful. Kant famously excludes mathematical objects from the realm of beauty but allows for the beauty of mathematical proofs. I argue that the same considerations that support the beauty of mathematics proofs also apply to geometric decorations. I use the case of mathematical purposiveness to put pressure on Kant’s analysis of purposiveness in the Critique of Judgment, focusing on formal purposiveness.

  • Draft available

    I reconstruct Kant’s account of rationalization (Vernünfteln) and its role in self-deception. I argue that rationalization is not itself self-deception, but a distinctive epistemic mechanism that makes self-deception possible. Rationalization refers to reasoning patterns that mimic ordinarily sound reasoning to prevent or stop cognition. It provides apparent justification or apparent defeat by generating inconclusive but counterfactually relevant considerations, which distract from and undermine confidence in conclusive grounds. Thus, it cultivates inattentiveness to conclusive reasons. This “empty use of reason” explains how agents can suspend judgment and ignore the evidential support provided by their conclusive reasons. Therefore, rationalization enables self-deception without requiring contradictory beliefs or an intention to deceive. By providing a detailed analysis of the epistemic mechanisms in rationalization, I solve a pressing problem for alternative accounts, the lack of clear criteria to distinguish good reasoning from deviant rationalizations.

Other Projects

Why Read Kant Today? Reflections on the Value of the History of Philosophy

I am working on a book project on the broader value of studying Kant. On one hand, I show that we live in a world deeply shaped by Kant’s legacy. I plan to trace the history of the reception of four or five Kantian ideas, to understand his inheritance. On the other, I rely on Kant and his legacy to argue that doing history of philosophy allows us to interrogate the implicit assumptions of our time.

Philosophy & Theology: a Match (and Divorce) Made in Heaven

I am planning a longer project on the historical development of the progressive separation between philosophy and theology. Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason emerged amid religious censorship, defending philosophy’s independence from ecclesiastical control. My goal is to trace the evolving relationship between philosophy and theology in the context of the university’s growth as an independent institution, from the medieval period to Kant’s era.