Abstract: There are important disanalogies between inner and outer sense in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. I focus on one such disanalogy: although all intuitions are in time, time is the immediate condition only of inner appearances, while it is merely the mediate condition of outer ones (KrV, A 34/B 50). I argue that Kant’s account of self-affection makes room for distinctively inner intuitions—perceptions of our own mental states that inform our empirical self-consciousness. Against readings that deny the possibility of inner intuitions, I show that Kant’s claims about temporality and empirical self-consciousness can be interpreted in a way that not only allows for inner intuitions, but also requires them to explain how we perceive ourselves as thinking and feeling beings in time.

In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 677-686 doi:10.1515/9783110701357

Abstract: What conditions does a robot have to satisfy to qualify as a moral agent? Should robots become moral agents, or should humanity fully retain agency and personhood for itself? Is it permissible to prevent robots from developing moral agency? This paper examines these questions from a viewpoint-neutral and a Kantian perspective. Regarding the first question, we argue that the Kantian standards for moral agency could not possibly be met by robots. The second and third questions are more difficult to answer, in part because the viewpoint-neutral perspective does not provide a clear verdict. We argue that it is a feature of the Kantian perspective to propose a plausible answer. The idea is that preventing robots from achieving moral personality is morally permissible, insofar as our intention is consistent with the respect of human life and its rational nature.

In Hyeongjoo Kim and Dieter Schönecker (eds.), Kant and Artificial Intelligence, publisher: De Gruyter, pp. 147-168. doi:10.1515/9783110706611